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COMMENTS
sonable and necessary as to time 3 and area.14 While subjected to
early criticism,15 the doctrine of partial enforcement is being accepted
by an increasing number of courts'6 and leading authorities in the field
of contracts.'
Concededly, the application of the partial enforcement rule will in-
evitably result in the enforcement of a contract different from that for
which the parties bargained."' Where the only alternative is to refuse
enforcement entirely, however, this objection loses much of its force.
Clearly, partial enforcement more nearly effectuates the intent of the
contracting parties than does invalidating the covenant in its en-
tirety.' To permit partial enforcement of restrictive covenants within
the limits of the established public policy prohibiting contracts in re-
straint of trade does not appear to be an undue extension of equitable
principles. While not yet accepted by the majority of courts, the clear
trend of the better-reasoned recent cases is toward application of this
rule, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the prin-
cipal case is a sound one.
EVIDENCE-PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE EXCLUDES
TESTIMONY REGARDING ACCUSED'S SANITY BY
PSYCHIATRIST OF PUBLIC MENTAL HOSPITAL
Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
Defendant was indicted for grand larceny, robbery, and house-
breaking. Prior to trial, a court-appointed psychiatrist,' after ex-
amining defendant on several occasions, concluded that he was af-
flicted with severe schizophrenia2 and was mentally incompetent to
13. Whiting Milk Co. v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179 N.E. 169 (1931);
Brannen v. Bouley, 272 Mass. 67, 172 N.E. 104 (1930); Edgecomb v. Edmonston,
257 Mass. 12, 153 N.E. 99 (1926).
14. Metropolitan Ice Co. v. Ducas, 291 Mass. 403, 196 N.E. 856 (1935).
15. Compare 15 B.U.L. REv. 834 (1935), with 32 B.U.L. REV. 224 (1952).
16. John Roane, Inc. v. Tweed, 89 A.2d 548 (Del. 1952); Ceresia v. Mitchell,
242 S.W.2d 359 (Ky. 1951) ; American Weekly, Inc. v. Patterson, 179 Md. 109, 16
A.2d 912 (1940).
17. 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1390 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1660 (rev.
ed. 1937); Williston & Corbin, On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit, 23 CONN. B.J. 40
(1949).
18. This was the argument of the dissenting judge in the principal case. Fuller-
ton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 70 N.W.2d 585, 594 (Wis. 1955).
19. It should be noted that if there is any evidence of a deliberate plan to
coerce the acceptance of oppressive conditions, the restrictive covenant will be
held invalid under either the "divisibility" or "partial enforcement" test. Fuller-
ton Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 70 N.W.2d 585, 592 (Wis. 1955); 5 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 1660 (rev. ed. 1937).
1. The psychiatrist was appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1952), which au-
thorizes the court, on its own motion, to appoint a psychiatrist to examine an
accused if there is "reasonable cause to believe" he is mentally incompetent for
trial.
2. Schizophrenia is one of the most common of mental illnesses. The schizo-
phrenic, commonly considered to have a "split personality," is generally afflicted
with delusions and hallucinations which may result in criminal or anti-social
behavior. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 72-85 (1952).
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stand trial. The court consequently committed defendant to a public
mental hospital for further diagnosis and treatment. After seven
months of confinement defendant's competency was certified, and trial
was held in the federal district court of the District of Columbia.
At the trial, in support of defendant's plea of insanity, the psy-
chiatrist previously appointed by the court testified that defendant's
conduct while being examined prior to his confinement in the mental
hospital strongly indicated that he was insane3 at the time the crimes
were committed. A second psychiatrist, who had treated defendant
in the mental hospital, then was permitted to testify for the prosecu-
tion that defendant had freely admitted during his confinement that
he had faked the symptoms of schizophrenia he had exhibited when ex-
amined by the court-appointed psychiatrist. Defendant was con-
victed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
held that the information acquired by the hospital psychiatrist was
privileged under the local statute,4 and that its admission without
defendant's consent was reversible error.5
The physician-patient privilege, 6 unrecognized at common law,7
was created originally by legislation in New York in 18288 and is
presently established by statute in thirty-one states and the District
of Columbia.9 . In view of the extreme diversity of the various statu-
3. The psychiatrist testified that defendant could not distinguish "right and
wrong" in any major activity. Brief for Appellee, pp. 12, 13, Taylor v. United
States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955). The principal case was tried in the district
court while the "right-wrong" test of insanity prevailed in the District of Colum-
bia. Subsequently, in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D C. Cir., 1954),
1955 WAsH. U.L.Q. 86, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia adopted
a new test of insanity, under which an accused is not criminally responsible if his
action was the result of "mental disease or mental defect."
4. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-308 (1951).
5. Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Additional grounds
for reversal stated by the court were the trial judge's improper instructions to the
jury and his failure to make a judicial determination of defendant's competency
for trial as required by Gunther v. United States, 215 F.2d 493 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
6. The term "privilege" is a misnomer. If the patient takes the witness stand
he cannot invoke the physician-patient privilege in order to refuse to give testi-
mony. Nor can the physician himself invoke the privilege. The "privilege" is
really a power of the patient, by timely objection, to require the physician to refuse
to divulge information which is inadmissible under the applicable statute. See
Comment, 31 YALE L.J. 529 (1922).
7. The classic statement of the common law view was by Lord Mansfield:
If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal these secrets, to be sure he would be
guilty of a breach of honour, and of great indiscretion; but, to give that in-
formation in a court of justice, which by the law of the land he is bound to
do, will never be imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever.
The Trial of the Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Tr. 355, 573 (1776).
The common law view denying any general privilege to communications be-
tween physician and patient prevails in the following states: Alabama, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Ver-
mont, and Virginia.
8. For a discussion of the early statutes, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 (3d
ed. 1940).
9. ARiz. CODE ANN. §§ 23-103, 44-2702 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-607
(1947); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. (EVID.) § 1881 (1946); CoLo. REv. STAT. §
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tory provisions, 10 evaluation of the judicial opinions interpreting the
privilege is hazardous. 1 The decision in each case must be viewed in
light of the particular provisions of the jurisdiction's privilege statute.
Thus, a proper determination of the principal case turns on the pro-
visions of the District of Columbia Code, which provides for the privi-
lege in its most familiar form:
[N]o physician or surgeon shall be permitted, without the con-
sent of tne person afflicted, or of his legal representative, to dis-
close any information, confidential in its nature, which he shall
have acquired in attending a patient in a professional capacity
and which was necessary to enable him to act in that ca-
pacity .... 12
Since there was clearly a physician-patient relationship between
the hospital psychiatrist and the defendant at the time of the treat-
ment, there were two major questions which confronted the court.
First, in order to determine whether the information acquired by the
hospital psychiatrist was privileged, the court had to decide whether
the relation between a psychiatrist in a public mental hospital and a
patient confined therein was the type of "confidential" relation con-
153-1-7 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-308 (1951); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203
(1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1714 (Burns 1946); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 31, § 622.10
(1946); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-2805 (1949); Ky. REV. STAT. § 213.200 (1953); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:476 (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27-911 (1938); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1945); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1697 (Supp. 1954); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1949); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-701-4, 94-8801 (1947);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-1206, 25-1207 (1943); NEV. Comp. LAws § 8974 (Supp.
1949); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12 (1953); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 352 (Supp.
1942), § 354 (Supp. 1946); N.Y. CRIM. CODE § 392 (1939); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-
53 (1953); N.D. REV. CODE §§ 31-0106, 31-0107 (1943); OHIO CODE ANN. § 2317.02
(Supp. 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 385 (Supp. 1954); ORE. REv. STAT. §
44.040 (1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 328 (1930); S.D. CODE §§ 36.0101,
36.0102 (1939); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
5.60.060, 10.52.020 (1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4992 (1955); Wis. STAT. § 325.21
(1953); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 3-2602 (1945).
10. The physician-patient privilege is limited to civil actions in six states:
California, Idaho, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah. See statutes
cited in note 9 supra. In Louisiana the privilege apparently is restricted to crimi-
nal cases. Rhodes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 172 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 337 U.S. 930 (1949). In West Virginia the privilege applies only in
justice of the peace courts. Mohr v. Mohr, 119 W. Va. 253, 193 S.E. 121 (1937).
In the remaining Jurisdictions cited in note 9 supra, the privilege is applicable
both in civil and criminal actions.
The statutes also vary as to the subject matter of the privilege. Compare
KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-2805 (1949), with WIs. STAT. § 325.21 (1953). As to the
provisions for waiver of the privilege, compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060 (1949),
with NEV. COMP. LAWS § 8974 (Supp. 1949).
11. Dean Wigmore is especially caustic in his criticism of the privilege. 8 WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2380-91 (3d ed. 1940). This view is prevalent among legal
scholars generally. See, e.g., Chafee, Privileged Communications: Is Justice
Served or Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth? 52 YALE L.J. 607 (1943) ;
DeWitt, Medical Ethics and the Law, 5 WESTERN REs. L. REV. 5 (1953); Purring-
ton, An Abused Privilege, 6 COLUM L. REV. 388 (1906).
12. The statute further provides that the privilege is inapplicable in criminal
cases in which the accused is charged with injuring or causing the death of a
human being, if the disclosure is found to be needed in the interests of "public
justice." D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-308 (1951).
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-teaplated .by the statute.13 Secondly, if -such relation-was found to
be 'confidential, and the information acquired therefrom was held to
be privileged, then the court had to determine whether defendant had
waived his privilege by permitting the court-appointed psychiatrist
to testify regarding his mental condition.
In support of its contention that the physician-patient privilege was
inapplicable, the prosecution relied on numerous cases which have
refused to recognize the privilege when the physician involved was
not selected by the patient.14 In such cases, however, the physician
was not employed to treat, i.e., to prescribe a remedy for the patient,
but merely to examine him preparatory to testifying in a subsequent
trial as to his physical or mental condition. The courts in such a situ-
ation have readily concluded that the patient would not impart any
"donfidential" data if he knew that the physician intended to divulge
'incourt any information obtained.25 In cases in which the physician's
function was actually to treat the patient the majority of courts have
considered the source of the physician's employment as immaterial to
the determination of the confidentiality of the relation.0 In only two
states have courts held the privilege inapplicable because of the lack
of a "confidential" relation when the patient was treated by a physi-
cian not of his own choosing."
13. Although not discussed by the court, another issue involved was whether
defendant's admissions to the hospital psychiatrist were "necessary" for treat-
ment as provided in the statute. Courts generally have not required strict proof
that the information was "necessary"~ for treatment. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Co.
v. Marion, 123 Ind. 415, 23 N.E. 973 (1890); Gilbam v. Gillianm, 177 Pa. Super.
328, 110 A.2d 915 (1955). Seemingly, such an attitude should be particularly ap-
propriate in psychiatric cases, in which anything the patient reveals maybe
material to treatment. See GUTTIACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAw 77 (1952). Chafee has argued for a broad interpretation of the "necessary"
provision in the statutes, as the patient should not be expected to tell his story to
his physician "with the circumspection of a lawyer drawing pleadings." Chafee,
supra note 11, at 614.
14. Catoe v. United States, 131 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Commonwealth v.
DiStasio,'294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d 189 (1936) ; Simeeek v. State, 243 Wis. 439, 10
N.W.2d 161 (1943). See Brief for Appellee, pp. 47-52, Taylor v. United States,
222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
15. In addition to the cases cited in note 14 supra, well-reasoned opinions are
found in People v. Glover, 71 Mich. 303, 38 N.W. 874 (1888); People v. Austin,
199 N.Y. 446, 93 N.E. 57 (1910) ; Leard v. State, 30 Okla. Crim. 191, 235 Pac. 243
(1925) ; State v. Miller, 177 Wash. 442, 32 P.2d 535 (1934).
16. Gerick v. Brock, 210 P.2d 214 (Colo. 1949); State v. Townsend, 146 Kan.
982, 73 P.2d 1124 (1937) ; Vermillion v. Prudential Ins. Co., 230 Mo. App. 993, 93
S.W.2d 45 (1936); Garrett v. City of Butte, 69 Mont. 214, 221 Pac. 537 (1923);
Mehegan v. Faber, 158 Wis. 645, 149 N.W. 397 (1914). In lunz v. Salt Lake
City R,.R., 25 Utah 220, 70 Pac. 852 (1902), the court adopted the rather extreme
position that there was a "presumption" of confidentiality in any situation involv-
ing a physician-patient relation.
17. Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
aff'd, 269 App. Div. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1st Dep't 1945); Lumpkin v. Metropo-
litan Life Ins. Co., 75 Ohio App. 310, 62 N.E.2d 189, aff'd, 146 Ohio St. 25 64
N.E:2d 63 (1945). Conflicting results have been reached, however, within each of
these jurisdictions. See, in opposition to the cases cited, Westphal v. State, 191
Misc. 688, 79 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Lamarand v. National Life & Accident
Ins. Co., 58 Ohio App. 415, 16 N.E.2d 701 (1937).
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In finding the relationship between defendant and the hospital
psychiatrist to be "confidential" within the meaning of the statute,
the court in the instant case has adopted a sound view. In determin-
ing confidentiality the judicial inquiry should be directed, not merely
to the source of the physician's employment, but to the entire context
of the relationship between physician and patient. Furthermore, in a
factual situation such as that in the instant case, there are strong
policy considerations to justify the finding of a confidential relation-
ship. The most frequently asserted justification for the physician-
patient privilege is that a patient will hesitate to reveal his ailments
to a physician if he knows that his disclosures will not remain con-
fidential.- While the validity of such reasoning is doubtful in regard
to most illnesses,' psychiatric cases appear to be in a special cate-
gory.0 The psychiatrist must have the complete confidence of his
patient in order to evoke the highly personal data which is often
needed to prescribe proper treatment.1 The possibility that such
information could be publicly revealed would be an effective deterrent
to the patient's disclosures. Where the patient is confined in a mental
hospital pending trial, as in the principal case, the very purpose of
his confinement-diagnosis and treatment of his mental condition-
would be thwarted if the patient even suspected that the information
would be subsequently divulged in court.
Conceding, then, that the court properly found that there was a
confidential relation between defendant and the hospital psychiatrist,
and that the information acquired by the latter was privileged, the
further question, whether defendant impliedly waived the privilege
by permitting the court-appointed psychiatrist to testify to his mental
condition, is presented. It is in this area of implied waiver that the
main judicial controversy regarding the physician-patient privilege
has centered. The apparent conflict in the decisions is partially at-
tributable to the dissimilarity of the various statutory provisions.
The absence of any provision for waiver in a statute has been inter-
18. See, e.g., Jacobs v. City of Cedar Rapids, 181 Iowa 407, 164 N.W. 891(1917); Green v. Terminal R.R., 211 Mo. 18, 109 S.W. 715 (1908).19. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2380a (3d ed. 1940); Purrington, An Abused Priv-
ilege, 6 COLUM. L. REV. 388 (1906).
20. A note in 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 384 (1952), reports an Illinois circuit court
case, Binder v. Ruvell, Civil No. 52C2535, D. Ill., June 24, 1952, which recognized
a privilege for a patient's communications to a psychiatrist in an alienation of
affections case. The case is extraordinary since Illinois has no physician-patient
privilege statute. The court reasoned that the consultations between patient and
psychiatrist are more nearly analogous to a confessional between priest andpenitent than to the ordinary physician-patient relation.
21. GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 270-72 (1952).
In stressing the need of the privilege in psychiatric cases, the authors state:
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world.
He lays bare not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his en-
tire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame.
Id. at 272.
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preted by some courts as an expression of "legislative intent" to have
no implied waiver of the privilege.2 2 Other statutes providing for
waiver in certain situations are interpreted, under the exclusio alterius
maxim of construction, as excluding the possibility of a waiver of the
privilege in situations not expressly recognized in the statute.23 In
addition, some courts insist that the privilege statute should be strictly
construed because it is in derogation of common law,24 while others
assert that the statute is remedial and entitled to liberal construction. 2
Thus, the judicial confusion is apparent.
Courts are generally agreed that there is an implied waiver of the
privilege when the patient, voluntarily testifying in his own behalf,
details the nature of his illness and the information which he had
furnished to his physician.2 6 Similarly, the introduction of the phy-
sician's testimony by the patient waives the privilege to the extent of
permitting the opponent to cross-examine the physician as to any in-
formation acquired during the course of treatment.2 If a patient,
after joint treatment by two or more physicians, introduces the testi-
mony of one of the physicians, most courts find a waiver of the privi-
lege as to the other physicians present during the treatment.28 When
the treatment is by two or more physicians at different times, the
courts are not agreed as to whether the patient impliedly waives the
privilege by consenting to the testimony of one of the physicians. A
majority of courts have held that the privilege is not waived in such
a case, reasoning that the intent of the patient was only to waive the
privilege as to the particular physician who was permitted to testify.20
22. Smart v. Kansas City, 208 Mo. 162, 105 S.W. 709 (1907) ; Larson v. State,
92 Neb. 24, 137 N.W. 894 (1912).
23. See, e.g., Arizona & N.M. Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669 (1915) (interpreting
Arizona law); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Durkee, 147 Fed. 99 (2d Cir. 1906) (inter-
preting New York law).
24. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Morgan, 35 App. D.C. 195 (1910); Armstrong v.
Topeka Ry, 93 Kan. 493, 144 Pac. 847 (1914).
25. Jacobs v. City of Cedar Rapids, 181 Iowa 407, 164 N.W. 891 (1917);
Munz v. Salt Lake City R.R., 25 Utah 220, 70 Pac. 852 (1902).
26. Woods v. Incorporated Town of Lisbon, 150 Iowa 433, 130 N.W. 372
(1911); Apter v. Home Life Ins. Co., 266 N.Y. 333, 194 N.E. 846 (1935). When
the patient testifies only to general statements regarding his ailments, such
testimony is usually not interpreted by the courts as a waiver of the privilege.
Arizona & N.M. Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669 (1915) (interpreting Arizona law);
Green v. Town of Nebagamain. 113 Wis. 508. 89 N.W. 520 (1902).
27. Maas v. Laursen, 219 Minn. 461, 18 N.W.2d 233 (1945) ; State v. Litteral,
227 N.C. 527, 43 S.E.2d 84 (1947).
28. Doll v. Scandrett, 201 Minn. 316, 276 N.W. 281 (1937) ; Morris v. New York,
0. & W. Ry., 148 N.Y. 88 (1895); Cretney v. Woodmen Accident Co., 196 Wis. 29,
219 N.W. 448 (1928). Contra, Jones v. City of Caldwell, 20 Idaho 5, 116 Pac. 110
(1911).
29. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Morgan, 35 App. D.C. 195 (1910); Missouri &
N.A.R.R. v. Daniels, 98 Ark. 352, 136 S.W. 651 (1911); Acme-Evans Co. v.
Schnepf, 214 Ind. 394, 14 N.E.2d 561 (1938) ; Johnson v. Kinney, 232 Iowa 1016,
7 N.W.2d 188 (1942); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Hood. 124 Miss.
548, 87 So. 115 (1920) ; Larson v. State, 92 Neb. 24, 137 N.W. 894 (1912).
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A substantial number of courts, however, perceiving the obvious op-
portunities for fraud, have held that a waiver of privilege as to one
physician also waives the privilege as to others, regardless of the
separation in time of their treatments.30 The instant case is some-
what unique in that defendant could not have successfully invoked a
privilege as to the testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist even
if he had so desired, since the psychiatrist's function was merely to
examine defendant in order to determine his competency for trial.3 1
Thus, defendant did not technically waive his privilege by introducing
the testimony of the court-appointed psychiatrist. The question re-
mains, however, whether defendant's introduction of the testimony of
the court-appointed psychiatrist eliminated any further need for
secrecy regarding his mental condition, and therefore, as a matter
of fairness, constituted an implied waiver of the privilege to object to
the hospital psychiatrist's testimony.
Courts which have refused to imply a waiver of the privilege in
situations similar to that in the instant case have justified their de-
cisions under the familiar doctrine that waiver is a voluntary, inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right. This rationale, however, over-
looks the forceful consideration that an implied waiver should be
found, regardless of intention, when the patient's conduct has been
such that it would be both illogical and unjust to permit him to assert
the privilege.32 The privilege is not designed, after all, to give the
patient complete control of the presentation of evidence regarding
his physical or mental condition; rather, it is established to enable
the patient to prevent public disclosure of matters of personal con-
fidence. It must be remembered that the application of the privilege
results in the exclusion of reliable, relevant-often essential-evi-
dence; it is only when there is a strong social utility in the further-
ance of the privilege that the exclusion of such evidence can be justi-
fied. There is certainly no justification for a rule under which a pa-
tient may permit a physician favorable to his case to testify regarding
his ailments and then to assert a privilege when any other physician
who treated him seeks to contradict such testimony.33 Therefore, it
30. Armstrong v. Topeka Ry., 93 Kan. 493, 144 Pac. 847 (1914) ; State v. Sapp,
356 Mo. 705, 203 S.W.2d 425 (1947); Steinberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 263
N.Y. 45, 188 N.E. 152 (1933); McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wash. 2d 65, 253 P.2d 632
(1953).
31. See text supported by notes 14-15 supra.
32. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2388 (3d ed. 1940); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 219
(1954).
33. The leading proposed evidence codes contain provisions which would ex-
clude the privilege in a situation such as was present in the principal case. See
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 220(1), 223(3) (1942); UNIFORM RuLEs OF
EVIDENCE rule 27 (1953); WIGMORE, CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 216, art. 7(5) (3d
ed. 1942).
Citing the principal case as an example of an overly broad interpretation of
the privilege, the new Model Penal Code provides:
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would seem- that the court in the instant case should have ruled
that defendant's introduction of the testimony of the court-appointed
psychiatrist constituted an implied waiver of his privilege to object
to the testimony of the hospital psychiatrist.
A statement made by a person subjected to psychiatric examination or
treatment ... for the purposes of such examination or treatment shall not
be admissible in evidence against him in any [criminal] proceeding on any
issue other than that of his mental condition but it shall be admissible upon
that issue, whether or not it would otherwise be deemed to be a privileged
communication.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 409, comment at 201 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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